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Citizenship and Social Policy: the
Debate on the Citizen’s Income




1 The current social situation, all  over Europe, is dominated by the prevalence of mass
unemployment and declining living standards for the wage earning classes, whether they
work for the public or the private sector. Short term variations in the unemployment rate
enable governments to gloat over the success of their economic policy, as has been the
case  in  the  UK  since  the  beginning  of  2014,  or  encourage  the  opposition  to  attack
governments. In spite of national variations in the unemployment rate across Europe, the
long term picture is bleak. The combination of the shift to a post-industrial society, and of
neo-liberal social and economic policies, had, by the early years of the 21th century, led to
a  social  model  dominated  by  flexibility,  precarious  employment  and  a  race  towards
information technologies. Popular capitalism, owner occupancy, the activation of labour
markets made the model attractive at least for a section of the population. The bursting
of the Internet financial bubble in March 2000 was the beginning of a long decline, whose
rhythm accelerated when the real economy, then transport and tourism were hit. The
subprime crisis in 2008 was eventually quelled by governments, at the cost of a huge
public deficit, since banks had to be bailed out and saved from bankruptcy. European
policies, with the exception of a brief attempt at a Keynesian reflation in the UK under
Gordon  Brown,  remained  dominated  by  the  monetarist  principles  which  have  been
applied since the mid 1970s. The influence of the wage earning classes over society has
never been so weak since the 1920s. The social cost of austerity programs all over the EU
has been staggering and no solution is in view. 
2 In such a context, it is no wonder the search for alternative solutions has been given a
fresh impetus.  This  includes the work of  serious  economists,  like neo-Keynesian and
Nobel prize winner Paul Krugman, who seems to exert a much greater influence in the US
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than in the EU.1 This quest for fresh ideas also includes some minority currents, some of
them probably cranky, although it is hard to tell who will be taken seriously in the future.
Hayek and Friedman were for decades seen as dangerous extremists before they became
the inspirers of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Among those strange minority
currents, this paper is devoted to the study of the movement in favour of a basic universal
income, known in the UK as the citizen’s income. The contemporary campaign will be
briefly analysed, but most of the paper is devoted to a study of the historical sources of
the movement in the UK, since the 1920’s. The key point made in this chapter is the
following: the basic income is not a progressive policy designed to improve the fate of the
poor. It is a “safety net” type of benefit, akin to the “Speenhamland system” of the 18th
century, the supplementary benefit/income support of the British system and the RMI/
RSA in France. Ironically, it is presented as a revolutionary measure intended to free
individuals from the burden of “work”. Its philosophy is funded on the idea that work,
and in particular waged work, will no longer be the key component of social identity, and
will never again be available for all. Social structures will be based on …other, unspecified
factors which are never explicitly defined. The vulgum pecus will be kept at bay, but
offered a sufficient pittance to keep it away from mischief, just as the Old Poor Laws
became exceptionally generous in the UK during the French Revolution, so as to avoid
contagion. Even the French government contemplates a basic income for the under 25,
contrary to the RMI/RSA.  The basic income is  now part  of  the conservative deal  for
Europe, the only real question being the amount of the “income”, in the context of a
budgetary diet. Two alternative policies are on offer: austerity, a “creative life on the
dole”, and a basic income, or investment in infrastructures, economic stimulation, and a
return to growth and job creation.
 
The movement today
3 In January 2014, a petition launched under the European Citizen Initiative designed to put
a  “Citizen’s  income”,  known  as  the  “Universal  Basic  Income”  on  the  agenda  of  the
European Commission was rounded up without meeting its target. The magic number,
one million signatures was not met by a long way.2 Only 285,000 signatures were collected
in favour of the basic income within the lifespan of the initiative, 12 months. In Britain,
the  petition  was  not  very  successful,  with  only  10,111  signatures,  against  40,542  in
Germany and 37,415 in France.3 The basic income is intended to provide each citizen of a
given  country  with  a  fixed  amount,  throughout  his/her  life,  irrespective  of  age,
qualification, work, marital condition, number of children, earned or unearned income,
or readiness to work.
4 Its philosophy and aim are rather difficult to grasp. Ostensibly, the citizen’s income is
straightforward and the rhetoric supporting it surprisingly low key, commonsensical, and
apolitical. This is probably one of the reasons for its failure. The citizen’s income would
be financed through the tax system, and since the amount is uniform, it would be fairly
easy to manage. Where supporters diverge is the amount made available to citizens. This
is not a technical detail, but affects the whole philosophy of the scheme since a modest
amount would merely subsidise low pay, and encourage employers to pay low wages,
when a significant amount, in the region of 800 euros per month, would enable people
used to a frugal lifestyle to survive without obtaining a regular job. Any money earned on
top of the basic income remains in the individual’s pocket, and this does not affect the
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amount of the citizen’s income. British blue prints for the project quote £71 per week as a
feasible  objective,  whereas  even the  French Right  is  closer  to  800  euros  per  month,
roughly twice the British amount.
5 The campaign is led in the UK by two different bodies, the Citizen’s Income Trust4 on the
one hand and the local representatives of the European network known as BIEN (Basic
Income European Network), launched in 1986.5 The CIT is a lobby, led by Malcolm Torry,
the vicar of Holy Trinity Church, Greenwich, a Church of England progressive priest, with
an intellectual and academic record at the London School of Economics. It promotes the
idea in intellectual and political circles, although it has not met with a lot of success in
politics.  Not  one  British  MEP  signed  the  European  appeal  in  favour  of  the  citizen’s
income, a failure which is probably related to the political weakness of the Green party in
the UK. Most of the MEPs who did sign were ecologists, such as Eva Joly, José Bové and
Yves Cochet in France. Neither Labour nor the Conservatives were involved. The British
Greens only have two MEPs, who do not even seem to have signed the petition, which
suggests  the  British  campaign  is  probably  different  from  the  continental  one,  in
ideological and political terms.6 Reverent Torry, on the LSE web site, writes that “every
mainstream political ideology generates arguments for a Citizen’s income”, and spells
them out:
The New Right values the fact that a citizen’s income does not disincentivise (sic)
enterprise  in  the  way  that  means-tested  benefits  do.  One  Nation  conservatives
valued the combination of social cohesion and more efficient labour market offered
by a Citizen’s Income. Liberals value the freedom that a Citizen’s Income would give
to  people  to  make  choices  about  their  employment  patterns  and  relationships.
Social democracy values the combination of economic efficiency and redistribution
(…)  and  the  Third  Way  could  value  a  Citizen’s  Income  as  a  means  of  reducing
poverty in a globalizing economy.7
6 Indeed, the British campaign purports to be ideologically agnostic, or neutral, which is
not very convincing. Economic policy is predicated on social and political choices, and not
a purely technical issue. Indeed, the arguments deployed in favour of the scheme display
a curious similarity with neo-liberal or social liberal discourses. Just because such ideas
are commonplace today, it does not mean they can be taken as unchallenged truths. “The
best way to ensure the widespread availability of well-paid employment is to make the
labour market as free and as flexible as possible”; “A citizen’s Income would help reduce
the rigidities of the labour market”: thus spoke the Citizen’s Income Trust in 2013.8 This
philosophy is closer to that of Margaret Thatcher or Boris Johnson than to the European
TUC or progressive Keynesian economists like Paul Krugman. Submitting uncritically to
the  economic  zeitgeist  and  the  dominant  or  fashionable  discourse  in  Europe  is  not
“apolitical” or “neutral”, but sheer conservatism or conformism. 
7 Among the frequently asked questions, one finds “would people still work?”, an issue
clearly liked to the conservative rational choice theory, according to which people always
take the best advantage of situations, and only do what is in their best, usually short-term
interest. The answer is also quite typical: yes, people would indeed work, since a universal
income would remove the poverty trap and other disincentives. 
8 One of the most potent arguments seems to be the reduction in the number of  civil
servants necessary to administer today’s social assistance schemes. There is no denying
the  Department  of  Work  and  Pensions  and  other  social  administrations  are  vast
cumbersome bureaucracies,  and that  the monitoring and surveillance of  claimants  is
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expensive and time consuming. However, focusing on the absolute need to reduce public
spending is again more in tune with neo-liberal discourse than with progressive stances.9
 
Outside Britain
9 The  ideological  slant  of  the  contemporary  British  movement  seems  therefore  to  be
somewhat at variance with the French one, which is extremely eclectic and covers a wide
span, going from the supporters of Christine Boutin or Dominique de Villepin to the anti-
globalisation movement and readers of Le Monde Diplomatique10 of the most impeccably
radical credentials. The movement is indeed not only pan-European, but international,
and experiments carried out in India, Namibia and South America, as part of anti-poverty
campaigns,  are often quoted in the literature.  The scale of  the Indian and Namibian
experiences seems to be very small, since they are limited to one or a small number of
villages.  South  America  is  a  seething  cauldron,  where  radical  movements  and
experiments  sometimes  reach  national  proportions.  New  forms  of  democratic
representation  are  indeed  tried,  and  the  fascination  of  old  European  radicals  with
developments in Latin America is, up to a point, understandable. However, international
comparisons  require  first  and  foremost  an  analysis  of  contexts,  without  which  no
understanding can be reached. It is quite surprising to find references to Alaska alongside
comments on India. Indeed, the Republican authorities in Alaska, under Governor Jay
Hammond, have since 1976 put aside 25% of the oil revenue, invested it in the Alaska
Permanent Fund, in shares, bonds and real estate, and have paid out an equal sum to all
Alaskan citizens. Before the crisis the amount for one year was in excess of $2,000; last
year in the region of $900. It seems the total amount in the fund is in the region of $40
Billion. The irony of a situation where Tea Party supporter Sarah Palin doled out money
to citizens without any counterpart has been highlighted by many blog users in the US,
and Mrs Palin has even been called “a socialist”, which is quite unexpected and probably
unfair.11 Be that as it may, comparing the shrewd use of oil revenues by a no-nonsense
capitalist and pro-business administration in the richest country in the world with anti-
poverty policies in Namibia or India is a tall order, economically, politically, ideologically,
in a word, in historical terms. 
10 It is quite clear the global reach of the movement, its “transnational nature” is one of its
strengths, since participants feel they are part of a universalist dynamic, but in practice,
the national situations vary considerably. This is probably the reason why Europe was
chosen as a more realistic target. 
 
The historical roots of the movement in the UK
11 In historical terms, the references of the campaign are even more eclectic and misleading.
Several  texts  are available  in English,  and are used internationally.  Even though the
movement in Britain is obviously very marginal today, a large proportion of references
are  British.  France  is  historically  the  other  major  contributor.  Among  the  official
references the movement wants to promote and stress, some are largely symbolic and
rhetorical.  Some prestigious authors who made a passing reference to some form or
another of basic income are singled out and mentioned systematically, obscure authors
are  sometimes  given prominence when a  number of  fairly  significant  movements  or
individuals  are  mentioned  very  briefly.  Again,  as  in  geography  and  contemporary
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references, authors are not presented or classified according to their political leanings.
Early supporters of the idea that the state has a specific responsibility towards the poor
are dragooned into the basic income brigade, just as the souls of 19th century peasants
from the South West of France are claimed by Mormons and registered in their database.
Yet, not all social schemes can be considered as forerunners of the “Citizen’s income”. So
references to Vives, and to the old Poor Laws are probably exaggerated. Many references
are  made  to  Tom  Paine  in  Basic  income  literature,  but  they  seem  somewhat  over-
enthusiastic and far-fetched. Paine, in a pamphlet written in 1797, “Agrarian Justice”,
advocated  a  redistribution  of  income  derived  from  land  ownership  to  the  whole
population, through the form of a pension for old people, or a lump sum at adulthood.
This amounted to a land tax. He did not advocate a permanent universal income for all
citizens. 
 
The Inter war years: Russell, Douglas, Cole
12 The period between the two world wars is probably the most significant one as far as the
basic  income is  concerned.  Again,  Britain is  the focal  point.  There are probably two
reasons why original or innovative plans were conceived and promoted, sometimes with
some  success,  during  these  otherwise  sad  decades.  The  first  reason  is  that  the
government embarked in 1917 in a rhetorical exercise known as “reconstruction”. The
point was to keep the British population going in spite of the stress of war and war time
work, by promising bold reforms. Intellectuals were encouraged to draught blue prints of
the “new Britain” that was supposed to be built after the war. The government promises
are symbolised by Lloyd George’s statement that the authorities would build “homes fit
for heroes”. Only a handful were built.  One of the best minds of the realm, Bertrand
Russell, mathematician, philosopher, aristocrat, political and cultural radical produced a
well-known book entitled “Principles of social reconstruction”.12 This was very bold and
successful,  well  beyond  the  radical  circles  that,  before  the  war,  were  attracted  by
imaginative  schemes  such  as  those  of  the  Guild  Socialists.13 Russell,  who  had  been
victimised  during  the  war  for  his pacifism,  became  fairly  famous.  His  criticism
encompassed the economy, the exploitation of wage labour, but also education, which he
found classical and authoritarian, and marriage, which held women in subjection. Russell
was extremely sympathetic to the cause of women, whom he loved dearly, and for whom
he had a very keen interest. He was also an avowed atheist, which, at the time, was fairly
bold. In a word, Russell  was a modern thinker who foresaw the importance of issues
which only reached the agenda decades later. He was also one of the earliest critics of the
USSR.14 He took part in the first visit of left wing intellectuals to Russia, met Lenin, and
wrote a devastating book on his return, when so many Fabians, like the Webbs, were
sheepishly praising the regime.15 
13 It is no wonder, with such intellectual and political credentials, that Russell should be
found  in  the  pantheon  of  many  innovative  currents,  and  that  his  name  should  be
associated to such endeavours. There is indeed some evidence that Russell made some
reference to a basic income, to be granted to all individuals regardless of their efforts or
merits in a book entitled ‘Roads to Freedom: Anarchism and Socialism”.16 But Russell was
no economist, he was not a practitioner of the “dismal science” and he only mentioned
the need for some sort of universal benefit briefly. The other reason why the interwar
years were favourable to social innovation is directly linked to objective developments
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and not to government policy. British industry underwent very rapid changes, whose
social  impact  was  tremendous.  Whole  sectors,  such  as  mining,  engineering,  textile,
declined dramatically, leaving millions out of a job until their last day, while, in other
regions,  the  Fordist  system was  in  full  swing.  Chemicals,  electricity,  automobile  and
aircraft  production  provided  not  only  employment  but  reasonable  wages,  especially
compared  to  pre-1914  levels.  Macro-economic  management,  in  particular  orthodox
monetary  policies,  geared  towards  the  re-establishment  of  the  gold  standard,  were
severely criticised by Keynes. The similarity between the interwar years and the situation
prevailing in Europe since the beginning of the crisis is striking. In both cases, the work
process  has  been  revolutionised  by  technological  change,  leading  to  a  blurring  of
traditional  social  categories,  and  macro-economic  policies  obviously  led  to  massive
unemployment  levels.  In  other  words,  the  wage  earning  classes  pay  the  cost  of
technological  change,  and most  authorities  follow the same classical  line,  sentencing
millions to the dole. One had to wait until the mid-1930s for Keynesian policies to be
adopted, openly in the US, and de facto in Britain. The combination of a disastrous social
situation  and  counterproductive  economic  policies  encouraged  fresh  thinking  in  the
1920s as it does today. The idea was taken up by one of the most fertile brains of the
labour movement, GDH Cole. Cole had been fairly experimental before the war, and was
one of the intellectual leaders behind the Guild Socialist movement, a grouping of artists
and intellectuals,  owing partly its origins to the work of William Morris,  providing a
political, literary and artistic coverage to the Industrial syndicalist movement. Cole was
an extremely prolific writer, and published about a hundred books.17 He was clearly on
the  left  of  the  labour  movement,  and a  supporter  of  the  rather  radical  New Fabian
Research Bureau. Like Russell, he was openly supportive of the “social dividend”, but he
also supported many other options and causes. The idea of a basic income was not the
alpha and the omega of his thinking. 
14 This was not the case of the most influential movement related to the notion, known as
the social credit movement.18 Even though the economic credentials of the movement
were criticised,  it  was both a typical  product of  its  time,  and a minor player on the
ideological field. It did have a direct impact on politics in one country, Canada. The views
developed by Major Douglas, its chief proponent, were stigmatised and clearly presented
as cranky, although not by Keynes, who disagreed on the technical demonstration but
shared some of the premises.19 James Meade, another Nobel prize winner, wrote in his
autobiographical note: 
My interest in economics had the following roots. Like many of my generation I
considered  the  heavy  unemployment  in  the  United  Kingdom  in  the inter-war
period as both stupid and wicked. Moreover, I knew the cure for this evil, because I
had become a disciple of the monetary crank, Major C.H. Douglas, to whose works I
had been introduced by a much loved but somewhat eccentric maiden aunt. But my
shift  to  the  serious  study  of  economics  gradually  weakened my belief  in  Major
Douglas.20
15 The notion of social credit was based on the idea that every person should receive an
unconditional allowance and be given access to consumption. According to Major Douglas
the  problem  affecting  the  British  economy  was  under-consumption.  He  shared  this
analysis with Keynes, even though his economic reasoning was found lacking. Douglas’s
proposal was therefore to encourage individual consumption. His perspective was not
based on state policy, and in this respect he diverged from Keynes, who was concerned
with influencing policies and public spending, as well as from the New Deal policies which
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were adopted ten years later in the United States. The state was not to the chief agent of
policy, a feature Social Credit has in common with the contemporary supporters of the
citizen’s income. Douglas shared the defiance of the romantic radical socialists such as
the Guild Socialists towards the state. His first article was indeed published by the New
Age, a literary journal produced by a distinguished intellectual, Orage, who had actively
supported the Guild Socialists before the war. It is no wonder Sidney Webb, the pope of
British collectivism, was harshly critical of Social Credit. Politically, Douglas shared the
Keynesian criticism of the Bank of England, of conservative policies, and of the governor
of  the  Bank,  Montague  Norman,  who  was  largely  responsible  for  the  Conservatives’
strategies of the BoE, and whose effigy was burned publicly. However, he was not clearly
aligned with the  left.  The  Labour  party  was  miles  away from the  prospect  of  social
experiments, and spent much time recovering from the defeat of 1924, the crushing of
the General Strike in 1926, MacDonald’s defection in 1931 … at the hands of the Bank of
England. The unions kept aloof from the perspective of Social Credit, and concentrated on
their primary function, incomes and working conditions. The hardening of the Means
Test after 1931 was seen as evidence of Mac Donald’s alignment on the Conservatives. In
the long run, this issue remained crucial, but was not embraced by Social Credit at the
time. The social creditors refused to be considered as socialists, or as part of the labour
movement, which was quite typical of the period. 
16 Douglas’s  followers  in  the  UK  included  a  lunatic  fringe,  the  “Kibbo  craft”,  a  weird
outgrowth  of  the  boy-scout  movement,  which  advocated  a  rural  and  primitivist
philosophy based on the notion of a simple life and devotion to duty.21 The group donned
a green uniform and marched in several cities, until the banning of private uniforms in
1937. Green bricks were occasionally thrown at 11 Downing Street. It created a Social
Credit Party in 1935 but disappeared in 1939. A group seceded from the slightly worrying
“Kibbos” and created the Woodcraft Folk, the quite respectable youth organisation of the
cooperative movement,  which still  exists  today and has provided outdoor sports and
entertainment to the sons and daughters of thousands of left leaning families.22 
17 The social  credit  movement was,  understandably,  suspected of  fascist  leanings at  the
time, and a lot of individuals and movements hesitated between several options. Indeed,
the Social Credit Party’s love of uniforms and martial antics did have some similarities
with fascist organisations. The French rural movement “Chemises vertes”, under Roland
Dorgères, which ended up supporting Maréchal Pétain during the war, shared the SCP
aesthetics, if not their policies.23 Political and ideological uncertainty was a feature of the
30’s as well as of the early 21st century. In Canada, the SC party was extremely successful
in Alberta. In 1935, it was elected at the head of the province, for a number of years. The
lack of a social and ideological culture within the movement explains the crisis which
followed this success. The governor insisted on pursuing an orthodox financial policy and
refusing to let the public deficit  increase – a conservative policy in keeping with his
Christian fundamentalist outlook, but which was in clear contradiction with the origins of
the  movement.  Again,  this  lack  of  a  political  culture  is  a  feature  the  Social  Credit
movement  has  in  common with the contemporary citizen’s  income movement.  Anti-
globalisation activists as well as Social Christians and neo-liberals are to be found among
its supporters. Douglas adopted a fairly radical questioning of capitalism and took up
again Marx’s view on the wage relationship, described as “wage slavery”, again, like at
least the French supporters of the basic income. He also criticised traditional politics and
believed that the role of political institutions should be much simplified and reduced to
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the execution of decisions taken by citizens on an ad hoc basis, through a process of
direct  representation.  Such  ideas  and  criticisms  of  parliamentary  democracy  were
directly borrowed from the pre-1914 syndicalist movement, and from the Guild Socialists,
its  intellectual  counterpart.  Politics  as  such would become irrelevant,  and the secret
ballot abolished. Such stances could easily lead the movement towards fascism as well as
anarchism.  Luckily,  the  movement  disappeared  during  the  war,  at  least  in  the  UK,
although it still has a handful of admirers.
 
An alternative to the welfare state?
18 The Second World War, from a social point of view, is dominated by the overbearing
figure of William Beveridge. The struggle against the five giants would indeed be based on
universal principles, since everyone would contribute according to their means, and have
equal access to services. However, one of the chief characteristics of the welfare state was
precisely to supply services directly, and not to enable the population to purchase private
services. Education, health, public housing, and, later, transport and energy would be
provided by state operated institutions. This was an extremely advanced form of “mixed
economy”, in which commodification, as we call it today, or “market principles” were
shunned. Britain was much more advanced than France in this respect, especially in the
field  of  health,  since,  in  France,  provision  was  and  had  remained  private,  with  the
exception of teaching hospitals. 
19 A number of reformers disagreed strongly with Beveridge, in particular a Liberal peer,
Juliet Rhys Williams, who proposed a “social contract” based on a benefit conditional
upon the person’s willingness to work, and enabling the recipient to purchase private
services.24 The conditionality of the scheme should not be overplayed, since,  in 1943,
military  or  industrial  conscription  was  the  rule  for  the  whole  population,  including
women under 50. However, from a political point of view, it is significant to note the
evolution  of  Juliet  Rhys  Williams,  who  became  an  active  member  of  the  extremely
conservative Monday Club. Her son, Sir Brandon Meredith Rhys Williams, 2nd Baronet,
was the Conservative MP for the working class constituency of South Kensington until
1988. He put the case for a basic income in the House of Commons, an argument which
bore some similarities with one of the key buzz-words of the neo-liberal current, Milton
Friedman’s negative income tax.
20 However,  Margaret Thatcher was not prepared to commit herself  to a new universal
benefit, especially in a decade when social spending actually increased because of the rise
of unemployment and the cost of maintaining 12 million people under the poverty line. 
 
Conclusion
21 The ancestors of the citizen’s income cover a surprisingly wide ideological span, from
former guild  socialists  to  self-taught  economists,  cranky  middle-aged  boy-scouts,
academically correct experts,  liberal peers and Thatcherite MPs.  Its appeal cannot be
related to a particular ideological tradition, but, in Britain, to specific issues. The notion
of citizenship was grafted recently on that of a more or less unconditional basic income.
This probably reflects the interest of British social thinkers for continental ideas. 
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22 In any case, four favourite themes of the citizen’s income chime to the ears of British
specialists, and are identified as real problems.
23 The first one, is the question of stigma. From the 19th century onward, poverty has been
stigmatised as evidence of a moral fault, and conditional benefits are still based on the
distinction between the deserving poor and the undeserving. The means test is one of the
key notions of British social policy. It has stigmatised millions of claimants since the days
of the Charity Organisation Society and is particularly humiliating. As a public policy, it is
central, but it is also hated by the people concerned, and has been combatted by the most
advanced and humane social reformers. A universal basic income implies the abolition of
the means test, and the removal of stigma. 
24 The second argument is more technical. The basis income would remove the poverty trap,
a well-known feature of contemporary social policies. In the current system, whenever
unemployed claimants find some work,  the income they earn is  deducted from their
benefit, and they end up with the same amount of money in their pockets. This is a strong
disincentive for work. This problem is well known, and many governments, including
Britain and France, have started allowing the combination of a full benefit and a small
wage, so as to encourage the unemployed to find some work. Clearly an unconditional
benefit solves the problem, since it can be combined with any kind of earned income.
25 The third argument reflects the weight of neo-liberal discourse in Britain: the citizen’s
income would be  easy  to  administer  and would allow cuts  in  the  number  of  people
employed by the government to run the existing benefits, and monitor their good use.
Reducing the size of government stands out prominently in the communication of the
supporters of the citizen’s income. 
26 The fourth and last argument is less identifiable ideologically, since it is promoted both
by the anti-capitalist left and by neo-liberals. The promotion of individual freedom is the
cardinal  value  cherished  in  Britain  by  everyone,  to  the  exclusion of  any  other.  The
citizen’s income would remove the obligation to work, and devote our lives to boring
tasks,  thus  creating  opportunities  for  many other  worthy  activities.  Whether  or  not
watching television ranks among the alternatives to work is open to question. For neo-
liberals, doing away with the systematic provision of social services by the state, and
enabling citizens to purchase the private services of their choice would open fantastic
opportunities, and open widely the avenues of individual freedom. 
27 It is hard to tell whether the idea of a citizen’s income has a future. Minority currents and
innovative ideas, such as the Tobin tax, have recently resurfaced, sometimes in surprising
quarters.25 The petition failed in 2014, but the problems related to social policy seem to be
intractable, especially in the context of social and economic policies leading to a decline
in living standards. The future is very open. 
28 Jean  Paul  Révauger,  professeur  de  civilisation  britannique  à  Grenoble,  Aix-en-
Provence, Schoelcher (Martinique) et Bordeaux est un spécialiste de l’histoire des
idées  et  de  l’histoire  la  gauche  britannique.  Il  a  publié  de  nombreux  articles
comparatifs sur la Grande-Bretagne et la France. 
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ABSTRACTS
The citizenship income, or « basic income » is an old idea, dating back to the 1920’s. Launched by
progressive utopians, it was taken up in the 1930’s by the Social Credit movement, which hovered
between  quackery  and  social  experimentation.  It  was  peddled  as  an  alternative  to  the
Beveridgian Welfare State by ultra-liberals, from the 1940’s onward, but is also popular among
ecologists and anarchists who welcome the end of waged work and of the definition of social
identity through work. Today, as an elegant companion for austerity and for the crisis, is it in
tune with conservative policies. 
Le revenu de citoyenneté, appelé aussi Basic Income, est une vieille idée remontant aux années
1920.  Inventée par  des  utopistes  progressistes,  elle  a  été  dans les  années  1930 reprise  à  son
compte par le mouvement du Social Credit,  hésitant entre charlatanisme et expérimentation.
Présentée comme une alternative au Welfare State par les ultra libéraux à partir des années 1940,
elle est aussi populaire dans le mouvement écolo-libertaire qui souhaite faire son deuil  de la
société salariale et du rapport au travail. Il s’agit aujourd’hui d’une stratégie d’accompagnement
de la crise et de l’austérité, parfaitement compatible avec les politiques publiques conservatrices.
INDEX
Mots-clés: revenu de citoyenneté, revenu de base, Social Credit, néolibéralisme, utopies,
écologie.
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